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What the Middle East Means for India

SESSION-7 What It Means For India .mp4 · 41:52 · 4 speakers

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Key takeaways

  1. The Gulf is strategically important to India through trade, remittances, energy, investment and a large diaspora.
  2. The UAE is portrayed as India’s strongest and most transformed Gulf relationship, particularly in trade, logistics, finance and business connectivity.
  3. The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor remains a long-term possibility, but security conditions are its main immediate obstacle.
  4. Regional instability is reportedly affecting Indian workers in UAE tourism, hospitality, aviation and retail sectors.
  5. Speaker 2 argued that India should preserve balanced relationships across Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE rather than view regional partnerships as zero-sum.
  6. Indian workers in the UAE are increasingly represented in professional, entrepreneurial and senior corporate roles, alongside blue-collar employment.
  7. Indian companies can use UAE infrastructure and incentives for regional operations, while Saudi Arabia remains a growing but less mature business environment.

Key moments

  • Session framing
    Speaker 1 invites an engaging, question-led discussion on why the Middle East matters to India.
  • Gulf’s importance to India
    Speaker 2 outlines trade, remittance, capital and energy links between India and the GCC.
  • Terminology and IMEC response
    Speaker 2 addresses “West Asia” versus “Middle East” and assesses the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.
  • UAE hub assessment
    Speaker 2 discusses Jebel Ali, Dubai and Abu Dhabi as trade and financial centres.
  • Diaspora disruption
    Speaker 2 describes reported employment effects on Indians in UAE tourism, aviation, hospitality and retail.
  • Diplomatic-balance critique
    Speaker 2 gives a personal assessment that India’s regional diplomatic balance has weakened.
  • Indian workforce transition
    Speaker 2 describes the growing professional and entrepreneurial presence of Indians in the UAE alongside labor vulnerabilities.
  • Business expansion opportunities
    Speaker 2 outlines UAE platforms and Abu Dhabi incentives for Indian firms.
  • Regional alignment discussion
    Speaker 2 assesses India–UAE relations, Saudi–Pakistan ties and Gulf hedging beyond the U.S. umbrella.
  • Saudi Arabia engagement
    Speaker 2 rejects an either/or India choice between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and compares their business environments.
  • Closing
    Speaker 1 thanks Speaker 2 and the audience and closes the session.

Decisions made

No explicit final decision was identified.

Proposals & suggestions (not confirmed decisions)

  • Develop a paperless, seamless India–UAE trade network, potentially creating a template that can be extended to other countries in the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. — proposed by Speaker 2. Outcome: Described as under discussion by relevant participants; no final decision.
  • Use European expertise in inter-country and intra-regional transport to help address corridor logistics issues. — suggested by Speaker 2. Outcome: Speaker 2 considered this a more remote possibility than resolving regional security concerns.
  • Indian companies could use Abu Dhabi’s Kizad incentives to establish alternate regional operating bases and export to the region. — suggested by Speaker 2. Outcome: Speaker 2 said some Indian companies are already visibly pursuing this approach.
  • India should insulate its bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia from Saudi Arabia’s relationships with Pakistan or other countries. — suggested by Speaker 2. Outcome: Presented as Speaker 2’s recommended approach; no formal decision.

Topics discussed

Opening: India’s stake in the Middle East

to 06:22 Speaker 1, Speaker 2

Speaker 1 introduced an audience-led discussion and emphasized the Middle East’s importance to India, including its large Indian population. Speaker 2 outlined the region’s importance through trade, remittances, investment, energy and historical ties.

Terminology and India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor

to 12:50 Speaker 2, Speaker 3

Speaker 3 asked about “Middle East” versus “West Asia” terminology and the viability of the economic corridor. Speaker 2 explained the terminology trade-offs and said technical work is underway, but regional security is the overriding obstacle to the corridor.

UAE trade, logistics and financial-hub role

to 16:32 Speaker 2, Speaker 3

Speaker 3 asked whether UAE emirates could develop further as offshore financial centres and whether the CEPA benefits India. Speaker 2 said the UAE is already functioning as a major regional trade and finance hub, with competition emerging among Dubai, Abu Dhabi and other emirates.

Regional unrest, diaspora impacts and Indian diplomacy

to 22:42 Speaker 1, Speaker 2, Speaker 3

Speaker 3 asked about the effects of Houthi-related unrest on the Indian diaspora and India’s regional positioning. Speaker 2 described reported employment disruption in UAE service sectors and offered a personal critique of India’s recent regional diplomatic balance.

Indian workers in the UAE

to 29:36 Speaker 1, Speaker 2, Speaker 3

Speaker 3 asked about blue-collar worker conditions and opportunities for white-collar workers. Speaker 2 described a growing professional and entrepreneurial Indian presence, improving formal-sector conditions, and ongoing risks for irregular migrants and domestic workers.

Business opportunities for Indian companies

to 32:09 Speaker 2, Speaker 3

Speaker 3 asked how Indian businesses can partner with the region. Speaker 2 highlighted the UAE’s ease of doing business, the presence of Indian firms in Dubai, and Abu Dhabi’s Kizad incentives for industrial operations serving regional markets.

India–UAE, Saudi–Pakistan and regional alignments

to 36:55 Speaker 1, Speaker 2, Speaker 3, Speaker 4

Speaker 3 asked whether India is tilting toward the UAE while Saudi Arabia moves toward Pakistan. Speaker 2 said India–UAE ties appear robust, Saudi–Pakistan links are longstanding, and Gulf states are pursuing a “U.S. plus” hedging strategy amid doubts about U.S. capacity.

Saudi Arabia as a business and strategic partner

to 41:35 Speaker 1, Speaker 2, Speaker 3

Speaker 3 asked whether India should deepen business engagement with Saudi Arabia or favor the UAE. Speaker 2 rejected an either/or approach, urged India to insulate Saudi bilateral ties from Saudi ties with other countries, and said Saudi Arabia is improving but remains behind Dubai and Abu Dhabi in ease of doing business.

Important questions

  • Should the region be called “West Asia” rather than “Middle East”? — asked by Speaker 3
    Answered Speaker 2 said “West Asia” is geographically more accurate, but it creates boundary complications; “Middle East” remains a conventionally understood term covering a wider region.
  • Is the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor viable given multimodal, customs and geopolitical challenges? — asked by Speaker 3
    Answered Speaker 2 said technical work on logistics, digital systems and connectivity is progressing, especially on the India–UAE leg, but security is the larger obstacle. Meaningful progress depends on regional security and an Israeli plan for Palestinians acceptable enough for Saudi participation.
  • Will UAE emirates become offshore financial centres, and does CEPA offer India a strategic trade and finance advantage? — asked by Speaker 3
    Partially answered Speaker 2 said the UAE is already operating as a major trade and financial hub through Jebel Ali, DIFC and Abu Dhabi’s growing ADGM, and that Dubai is an important regional capital-allocation gateway. CEPA was not directly assessed in detail.
  • What is the impact of current unrest on the Indian diaspora, and how should India hedge its regional position? — asked by Speaker 3
    Answered Speaker 2 said Indian workers in UAE tourism, aviation, hospitality and retail are reportedly experiencing disruption, leave requests and uncertain returns. Speaker 2 argued India should have preserved its traditional balance among conflicting regional relationships rather than tilt fully toward Israel.
  • Are reported poor conditions for blue-collar Indian workers accurate, what does the government do, and are white-collar opportunities expanding? — asked by Speaker 3
    Answered Speaker 2 said formal-sector conditions are generally good or improving, while illegal migration and domestic work create greater risks. Embassies conduct labor-camp visits and offer health and financial-literacy support; the Dubai consulate operates a shelter for runaway domestic workers. Speaker 2 also described a significant expansion in professional, entrepreneurial and senior Indian roles.
  • How can Indian businesses partner directly with the region for growth? — asked by Speaker 3
    Answered Speaker 2 cited UAE ease of doing business, Dubai’s established role as a regional headquarters base, and Kizad incentives in Abu Dhabi for light engineering and clean industries serving regional export markets.
  • Is India moving toward the UAE while Saudi Arabia moves toward Pakistan, and how should India navigate this? — asked by Speaker 3
    Answered Speaker 2 said India–UAE ties are on firmer footing, Saudi–Pakistan links are longstanding, and regional states are hedging through a “U.S. plus” strategy. Speaker 2 said the environment remains in flux and may take a couple of years to settle.
  • Should India and Indian businesses build greater space in Saudi Arabia or favor the UAE? — asked by Speaker 3
    Answered Speaker 2 rejected an either/or approach. India should retain and deepen Saudi ties, while businesses should recognize that Saudi Arabia is still behind Dubai and Abu Dhabi on ease of doing business despite substantial progress.

Important numbers & facts

  • Six GCC countries — Speaker 2 listed Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE as the GCC group.
  • 10,500,000 people — Speaker 2 gave this as the UAE’s population while noting it is India’s third-largest trading partner.
  • Third-largest trading partner — Speaker 2 said the UAE is India’s third-largest trading partner, after the United States and China.
  • $134 billion — Speaker 2 stated this as global remittances received by India in the prior year.
  • About $60 billion — Speaker 2 said this amount of India’s remittances came from GCC countries in the prior year.
  • $34 billion — Speaker 2 said the UAE alone contributed this amount in remittances in the prior year.
  • About $1 trillion in assets — Speaker 2 described Abu Dhabi Investment Authority as the world’s second-largest sovereign wealth fund with approximately this asset level.
  • About 60% — Speaker 2 said roughly this share of India’s energy requirements has traditionally been sourced from the Gulf.
  • 1822 to 1966 — Speaker 2 said that, except for Saudi Arabia, the Indian rupee was legal tender in Gulf states from the 1822 maritime treaty period until 1966.
  • 1,400 kilometers — Speaker 2 said Saudi Arabia already has a rail connection of this length to the Jordanian border in the proposed corridor route.
  • 300 kilometers — Speaker 2 said the proposed corridor would require this distance in Jordan before reaching the Israeli border.
  • One third of Dubai’s GDP — Speaker 2 said DP World, through Jebel Ali and the free zone, accounts for this share of Dubai’s GDP.
  • 23 Indian banks — Speaker 2 said this number of Indian banks have branches or representation in DIFC.
  • 4.5 million Indians — Speaker 2 gave this as the estimated number of Indians in the UAE.
  • 40% of the country’s population — Speaker 2 said the estimated 4.5 million Indians represent this share of the UAE population.
  • About 60% — Speaker 2 estimated that blue-collar workers may account for this proportion of Indians in the UAE.
  • 10,000 Indian dollar millionaires — Speaker 2 cited an estimated figure from a report for Indian dollar millionaires in the UAE.
  • From 2.5 million to 4.5 million over 15 years — Speaker 2 said the Indian population in the UAE had grown by this amount over the preceding fifteen years.
  • 16,000 Indian companies — Speaker 2 said this many Indian companies are listed with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce.
  • A couple of years — Speaker 2 estimated that regional alignments may take this long to begin settling down.
  • About ten years behind Dubai and Abu Dhabi — Speaker 2 said Saudi Arabia is reportedly this far behind Dubai and Abu Dhabi in ease of doing business.

Speaker highlights

Speaker 1

Main points

  • Opened the session as an informal, question-led conversation on the Middle East’s significance for India.
  • Emphasized India’s direct linkages with the region, including proximity, energy and diaspora connections.
  • Added observations on changes to the Kafala system and the historical India-UAE/Pakistan-UAE relationship.
  • Managed audience questions and closed the session by promoting Speaker 2’s forthcoming book on India-UAE relations.

Positions

  • The Middle East will continue to matter to India despite regional instability.
  • Labor-system reforms have occurred, though further improvements are needed.
  • India has not abandoned Saudi Arabia as a partner.

Speaker 2

Main points

  • Explained the Gulf’s strategic importance to India through trade, remittances, energy, investment and historical ties.
  • Addressed the terminology of “Middle East” and “West Asia,” and assessed the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.
  • Described the UAE’s trade, logistics and financial-centre development, including Dubai, Jebel Ali, DIFC and Abu Dhabi’s ADGM and Kizad Zone.
  • Discussed impacts of regional disorder on Indian workers and offered a personal assessment of Indian diplomacy toward Israel, Iran and the Palestinian issue.
  • Explained the diversification of the Indian community in the UAE and the conditions affecting blue-collar and domestic workers.
  • Discussed business opportunities in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as shifting regional alignments.

Positions

  • “West Asia” is geographically more accurate, but “Middle East” remains a useful conventional term.
  • Security is the main obstacle to meaningful near-term progress on the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.
  • India should maintain balanced, non-zero-sum relationships in the region.
  • India’s recent approach toward Israel, in Speaker 2’s personal view, harmed India’s regional standing and traditional balance.
  • India–UAE ties are robust, while Saudi Arabia should remain an important partner rather than an alternative to the UAE.
  • Saudi Arabia is progressing but remains less attractive than Dubai and Abu Dhabi in ease of doing business.

Speaker 3

Main points

  • Asked about terminology for the region and the viability of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.
  • Asked about UAE’s potential as a trade and financial centre and the strategic relevance of CEPA.
  • Asked about effects of regional unrest on the Indian diaspora and India’s diplomatic hedging.
  • Asked about blue-collar labor conditions, government support, and opportunities for Indian white-collar workers.
  • Asked about regional business opportunities, regional alignments, and India’s engagement with Saudi Arabia.

Positions

  • Suggested that the UAE takes an anomalous or tangential foreign-policy approach relative to other GCC or OPEC countries.
  • Raised concerns about multimodal transport, customs and geopolitical uncertainty affecting corridor viability.
  • Noted reports of poor conditions and abuse affecting blue-collar and domestic workers.

Questions raised

  • Whether India should use “West Asia” rather than “Middle East.”
  • Whether the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor is viable.
  • Whether UAE could become a larger offshore financial centre and whether CEPA gives India a strategic advantage.
  • How unrest affects the Indian diaspora and how India should hedge in the region.
  • Whether conditions for Indian blue-collar workers are as poor as widely reported and whether white-collar opportunities are expanding.
  • How Indian businesses can partner with the region.
  • Whether India is tilting toward the UAE while Saudi Arabia tilts toward Pakistan.
  • Whether India should build business space in Saudi Arabia or favor the UAE.

Speaker 4

Main points

  • Briefly endorsed the preceding question as “Very good question.”

Follow-ups

  • Monitor the employment effects of regional disruption on Indian workers in UAE tourism, aviation, hospitality and retail, including workers asked to take leave or return home with uncertain recall.
  • Track security and political conditions affecting the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, including prospects for Israeli-Palestinian arrangements and Saudi participation.
  • Assess the potential for paperless India–UAE trade processes and their use as a template for broader corridor connectivity.
  • Continue attention to vulnerabilities facing irregular migrants and female domestic workers in the Gulf.
  • Monitor Saudi Arabia’s progress on ease of doing business and its attractiveness for Indian regional headquarters and investment.