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Future of India–US Cooperation Panel

PAFI - 25 September 2026 - 02-54-54 PM.mp4 · 54:13 · 4 speakers

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Summary

Speaker 1 opened the final session on the future of India–US cooperation, framing the central question as whether the relationship will develop through competitive collaboration, arm’s-length engagement, or deep trust based on shared values and interests. Speaker 2 noted that tariffs and an unsigned trade deal dominate current headlines, but argued that the bilateral relationship rests on substantial government, business, and people-to-people links built over roughly 25 years.

Speaker 3 argued that recent US national security and defense strategies indicate a structural shift in US priorities toward the Western Hemisphere and away from maintaining a rules-based international order. In Speaker 3’s view, India should approach the relationship through strategic realism rather than sentimentality, recognize that it is not currently a priority in Washington, and navigate relations with both the US and China rather than treating them as a binary choice.

Speaker 4 broadly agreed that US policy is unsettled and inconsistent, citing contrasting approaches by US defense and state institutions toward the Quad and the Indo-Pacific. Speaker 4 said the US has not yet determined how it will manage China as a near-peer competitor, and that personal political considerations associated with Donald Trump have contributed to recent stress in India–US ties. However, Speaker 4 emphasized that practical cooperation—including defense engagement, exercises, and functional-level meetings—has continued despite high-level tensions.

From the business perspective, Speaker 1 said companies must operate within sovereign policy choices but cannot ignore the commercial opportunity represented by India–US trade and market links. Speaker 1 described uncertainty as disruptive to corporate planning, while arguing that a completed trade agreement could unlock substantial sectoral collaboration. Speaker 1 urged businesses to remain agile and viewed India as a long-term market that requires sustained commitment rather than short-term investment.

The panel debated responsibility for strengthening the relationship. Speaker 1 said India also needs reforms that can attract long-term foreign direct investment, while Speaker 3 responded that Indian policymaking must first protect the interests of 1.44 billion people, including those dependent on agriculture, and that certain external demands are not feasible. Speaker 3 placed greater responsibility on US policymakers to determine what kind of long-term partners they want.

In audience questions, Speaker 4 stressed that defense is only one part of a much broader relationship, referring to trade, investment, diaspora, and students. Speaker 1 said the government’s rationale for tax incentives for data centers was not known, while observing that data centers are globally competitive investments, do not directly create many jobs, and may fit into a wider strategic technology value chain. Speaker 3 rejected the view that recent turbulence resulted from a single missed political calculation, instead attributing it to a deeper structural change in US policy. The session closed with a call for strategic autonomy, diversified global partnerships, and policy practitioners communicating India’s needs within their organizations.

Key takeaways

The panel characterized the current India–US relationship as resilient at the operational level but affected by strategic uncertainty and political volatility.
Speaker 3 and Speaker 4 both described a possible long-term shift in US global priorities, although Speaker 4 said sharp policy reversals remain possible.
The panel did not make any formal policy decisions; its conclusions were analytical and advisory.
Business cooperation was presented as an important stabilizing force, but Speaker 1 said companies need policy certainty and must make long-term commitments to India.
Speakers emphasized that India should preserve strategic autonomy, build domestic strength, and diversify partnerships rather than rely excessively on one country.
Practical India–US cooperation in defense, trade, investment, technology, diaspora, and education was described as continuing despite tensions.

Key moments

Session opening
Speaker 1 frames the panel on the future of India–US cooperation.
US strategic-shift argument
Speaker 3 argues that US policy documents signal changed global priorities.
Quad and Indo-Pacific uncertainty
Speaker 4 outlines inconsistent US institutional messaging and uncertainty over China policy.
Business perspective
Speaker 1 discusses trade, corporate planning uncertainty, and the potential value of an agreement.
India between US and China
Speaker 3 rejects a binary choice and urges pragmatic navigation of both relationships.
Future of US policy
Speaker 4 says reversals are possible but a return to past patterns is unlikely.
Debate over responsibility and reforms
Speaker 3 responds to Speaker 1’s call for India-side reforms by prioritizing domestic obligations.
Continuity in operational cooperation
Speaker 4 highlights ongoing defense and functional-level India–US engagement.
Audience Q&A
The panel addresses defense cooperation, data-center incentives, and foreign-policy assumptions.
Closing call for strategic autonomy
Speaker 2 closes by stressing diversified partnerships and practitioners’ role in communicating India’s needs.
Next forum announcement
Speaker 1 announces the next annual forum dates.

Decisions made

No explicit final decision was identified.

Proposals & suggestions (not confirmed decisions)

India should pursue a modus vivendi with both China and Pakistan to enable the country to realize its full potential. — suggested by Speaker 3. Outcome: No final decision; presented as Speaker 3’s prescription.
Businesses should remain agile and nimble enough to respond quickly when current uncertainties become clearer. — suggested by Speaker 1. Outcome: No final decision; presented as business guidance.
India should undertake reforms in sectors where long-term capital can flow, rather than rely on short-term interventions. — suggested by Speaker 1. Outcome: Challenged by Speaker 3, who said certain asks are not feasible given India’s obligations to its population and agricultural livelihoods.
Both governments should assess the relationship after 2029 and build a new bilateral framework or contract. — proposed by Speaker 4. Outcome: No final decision; framed as a future requirement.

Action items

Action	Owner	Deadline	Time
Mark calendars for the fourteenth annual forum on sixteenth and seventeenth of September next year.	Not specified	sixteenth and seventeenth of September next year

Topics discussed

Opening and session framing

to 04:10 Speaker 1, Speaker 2

Speaker 1 introduced the session, panelists, and the question of what form future India–US cooperation may take. Speaker 2 positioned the discussion against tariff disputes, a pending trade deal, and longstanding bilateral ties.

US strategic priorities and implications for India

to 17:01 Speaker 2, Speaker 3, Speaker 4

Speaker 3 reviewed US strategic documents and argued that US priorities have shifted. Speaker 4 discussed inconsistency between US institutions on the Quad and Indo-Pacific, uncertainty in US China policy, and the effect of Donald Trump’s politics on India–US relations.

Business outlook, trade and technology cooperation

to 26:43 Speaker 1, Speaker 2, Speaker 3

Speaker 1 discussed commercial realities for US companies in India, potential opportunities from a trade agreement, and the need for business agility. Speaker 3 argued that India must manage relations with both the US and China while dealing with a changing international order.

Prospects for US policy change and Indian policy responsibilities

to 42:27 Speaker 1, Speaker 2, Speaker 3, Speaker 4

Speaker 4 said US policy could reverse sharply in the future but may not return to pre-2017 or pre-2025 patterns. Speaker 1 called for India-side reforms to draw investment, while Speaker 3 stressed the limits imposed by India’s domestic priorities. Speaker 4 highlighted continuing defense and functional cooperation and suggested that both governments will need to construct a new framework after 2029.

Audience Q&A: defense, data centers and foreign-policy assumptions

to 51:21 Speaker 1, Speaker 2, Speaker 3, Speaker 4

Audience members asked about expanding defense cooperation with the US, tax incentives for data centers, and whether India misread the Republican campaign or expected sanctions-related flexibility. Speaker 4 contextualized defense within broader ties, Speaker 1 discussed the uncertain rationale for data-center incentives, and Speaker 3 attributed current tensions to structural rather than personality-only causes.

Closing remarks and next forum announcement

to 53:39 Speaker 1, Speaker 2

Speaker 2 closed the discussion by stressing strategic autonomy, balanced partnerships, and the role of policy practitioners in communicating India’s interests. Speaker 1 announced that the fourteenth annual forum is planned for sixteenth and seventeenth of September next year, followed by an informal closing reference to beer in the next room.

Important questions

How can India gain greater strategic relevance in the current US environment? — asked by Speaker 2
Partially answered Speaker 4 said US policy is unsettled, particularly regarding China, and that the relationship has also been affected by Donald Trump’s politics. Speaker 4 did not identify a specific route for India to gain relevance.
How much can India continue to trust the US under current conditions, particularly as India–China engagement develops? — asked by Speaker 2
Answered Speaker 3 said there is no binary US-or-China answer; India will need to deal with both while navigating an emerging international order pragmatically.
Will US policy change after two years, or has its current direction become deeply ingrained? — asked by Speaker 2
Answered Speaker 4 said sharp reversals are possible, but a return to the pre-2025 or pre-2017 period is unlikely; adjustments are more likely than restoration of earlier policy patterns.
Should India expand defense cooperation with the US rather than continue to prioritize Russia as a defense partner?
Partially answered Speaker 4 said defense is only one element of a broader relationship and, given weakened confidence, maintaining current defense engagement is an important near-term approach rather than pursuing a stated major expansion.
Did India give excessive data-center tax incentives through 2047, and will AI-era data centers again leave India providing services rather than creating jobs?
Partially answered Speaker 1 said the government’s rationale was unknown, agreed that data centers do not create jobs, and said they may nevertheless be strategically useful in a global technology value chain. Speaker 1 questioned whether domestic firms are establishing comparable data-center capacity.
Did India misread the Republican campaign or expect sanctions-related flexibility similar to the first Trump administration?
Answered Speaker 3 said India’s nonpartisan policy has value and that present turbulence is not caused by a missed meeting or isolated miscalculation, but by a deeper structural shift in how the US views its global role.

Important numbers & facts

25 years — Speaker 2 said both countries had spent the last 25 years building a robust and deep relationship.
November last year — Speaker 3 said the US released its national security strategy at this time.
January 2026 — Speaker 3 said the US released its national defense strategy at this time.
25% tariffs — Speaker 4 said Donald Trump had already imposed 25 tariffs on India and then imposed another 25% tariffs related to India buying oil from Russia.
74 critical technologies — Speaker 3 referred to 74 critical technologies benchmarked by the Louie Institute.
67 — Speaker 3 said China leads in 67 of the 74 referenced critical technologies.
1.44 billion people — Speaker 3 said Indian policymakers’ first responsibility is to the 1.44 billion people who call India home.
2029 — Speaker 4 said both governments would need to assess the relationship and develop a new framework after changes in 2029.
20% of exports — Speaker 4 said 20% of India’s exports go to the US.
more than $50 billion — Speaker 4 said Indian companies have invested more than $50 billion in the US economy.
all 50 states — Speaker 4 said Indian companies have a presence across all 50 states in the US.
5.4 million — Speaker 4 cited a 5.4 million Indian-origin diaspora presence in the US.
till 2047 — An audience member said that this year’s budget provided a tax haven for data centers until 2047.
sixteenth and seventeenth of September next year — Speaker 1 announced dates for the fourteenth annual forum.

Speaker highlights

Speaker 1

Main points

Opened the session and introduced the panel’s theme: the future nature of India–US cooperation.
Presented a business perspective: firms must work within sovereign policy choices while pursuing the established commercial opportunity between India and the US.
Said uncertainty over tariffs and changing priorities complicates corporate planning.
Argued that India is a long-term opportunity and should not be treated as a part-time investment market.
Said data centers do not directly create jobs, but may have strategic value within a broader technology ecosystem.
Announced the next annual forum for sixteenth and seventeenth of September next year.

Positions

A completed trade agreement could create major opportunities for business collaboration.
Businesses should be agile and prepared to act when uncertainty becomes clearer.
India should pursue reforms that attract durable foreign direct investment, while recognizing the political difficulty of reforms.
Data-center tax incentives appear substantial; Speaker 1 could not confirm the government’s rationale.

Questions raised

How should businesses plan amid US policy inconsistency?
What commitment will US corporations make to India when India represents a relatively small share of global revenues?
Could tax incentives for data centers support a broader technology strategy?

Speaker 2

Main points

Moderated the panel and framed it around tariffs, the trade deal, and enduring bilateral links.
Identified government-to-government, business-to-business, and people-to-people dimensions of the relationship.
Asked panelists about US strategic change, business collaboration, corporate commitment to India, and whether India misread US political developments.
Closed by emphasizing strategic autonomy, diversified friendships, win-win bilateral relations, and the role of policy practitioners in conveying India’s interests within companies.

Positions

The India–US relationship has deep foundations despite current headline-level tensions.
Policy practitioners in US companies should communicate what their organizations should do for India, not only what India can do for them.

Questions raised

Whether India figures meaningfully in current US strategic thinking.
Whether US policy will change after two years or whether current approaches are entrenched.
How businesses can act as a bridge during uncertainty.
Whether India misread the Republican campaign or sanctions-related expectations.

Speaker 3

Main points

Argued that US national security and defense documents indicate a shift in US strategic focus and reduced commitment to a rules-based international order.
Said India should adopt clear-eyed realism and avoid sentimentality in foreign and strategic policy.
Suggested that the US strategic shift may outlast the current administration.
Said India faces constraints in dealing with China and the US amid a collapsing old order and an unformed new order.
Argued that India needs to manage relations with both the US and China, rather than choose between them.
Stated that India’s primary responsibility is to its 1.44 billion people and that some policy concessions affecting agriculture are not feasible.
Argued that India’s nonpartisan approach toward other countries’ electoral politics remains valuable.

Positions

The current US strategic shift is likely structural rather than only administration-specific.
The US bears substantial responsibility for defining the kinds of long-term partnerships it seeks.
India should seek a modus vivendi with both China and Pakistan in order to reach its full potential.
Personality-driven foreign policy relationships with sovereign implications are not a sound approach.

Questions raised

Will the US strategic shift outlast Trump two point o?
How should India obtain critical technologies amid US and Chinese power competition?
What kind of partners does the US want for the future?

Speaker 4

Main points

Said current US policy shows inconsistency, including differing signals from the Department of War and Department of State regarding the Quad and Indo-Pacific.
Said the US has not yet resolved how to manage China as a near-peer competitor.
Attributed part of the recent decline in India–US ties to Donald Trump’s political calculations rather than structural bilateral differences.
Said a future US administration may reverse some current policies, but a full return to earlier patterns is unlikely.
Highlighted continuing India–US cooperation in defense, military exercises, undersea-domain awareness, trade, investment, diaspora, and student ties.
Said the relationship’s previous framework has been disrupted and both governments will need to assess and build a new framework after 2029.
In Q&A, said defense is an important but not the most important aspect of the relationship.

Positions

India should remain adaptable, build its own strengths, and diversify partnerships.
US extraterritorial application of laws can weaken policy predictability and trust in technology partnerships.
At present, maintaining existing defense cooperation is more appropriate than seeking major expansion amid weakened confidence.

Questions raised

Will the US focus increasingly on the American continent?
Will it continue coercive or extraterritorial policies?
What will reduced US engagement in Europe and the Gulf mean for regional stability?
What new India–US framework should be built after 2029?

Follow-ups

Assess how India–US relations may be reframed after 2029, including what a new bilateral framework could contain.
Clarify the government’s strategic rationale and expected domestic value creation for data-center tax incentives through 2047.
Monitor the pending trade agreement and its potential sectoral implications for India–US commercial cooperation.
Monitor US policy direction on the Quad, Indo-Pacific, China, Europe, the Gulf, and extraterritorial regulatory measures.